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Abstract:
Over the last few years, considerable attention has focused on aid fragmentation, the
proliferation of donors and projects in developing countries.  Aid fragmentation has continued to
increase despite international efforts to foster donor coordination.  One possible implication of
fragmentation is smaller aid projects, potentially with the result of more administrative work for
overtaxed recipient governments per dollar of aid received.  In principle, project size can be a
function of donor characteristics, recipient characteristics, donor-recipient relations, and the type of
projects funded.
This paper makes use of PLAID data on bilateral aid commitments, sector, and funding
agency to explore the determinants of project size and to better understand the forces driving aid
fragmentation.  To the extent that project size is driven by the sectoral composition or purpose of aid,
the associated administrative costs may be justified.  Variations due to other factors, e.g., a donor's
administrative structure or bureaucratic interests, provide a stronger case for reforms.
Key Words: Foreign Aid; Aid Fragmentation; PLAID
JEL codes: F35I. Introduction
In the past five years, considerable attention has focused on aid fragmentation.  With the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) calling for substantial increases in aid flows, scholars and
practitioners have pondered what impact such increases would have.  How might increased aid
volumes be structured to avoid exceeding the absorption capacity of recipient country governments,
to maintain or enhance the development impact of aid?  The more fragmented is the delivery of aid
– between many donor agencies each with their own country missions, idiosyncratic reporting
standards, and schedules – the greater the administrative demands on recipient governments in
developing countries.  Inevitably, this diversion of resources reduces the value of aid.
The existing work on aid fragmentation focuses on three primary dimensions: donor,
recipient, and sector.  Donor aid fragmentation refers to the division of a given donor's aid budget
across many different recipients.  Recipient aid fragmentation measures the degree to which a given
country's aid receipts are fragmented across many different donors.  Sectoral fragmentation can be
examined at the donor level or at the country level.
Each dimension provides a different vantage point from which to assess problems associated
with fragmentation.  Donor fragmentation (across recipients or sectors) is the proximate source of
these problems.  Recipient fragmentation (across donors or sectors) is the symptom and provides a
measure of the extent of the problem.  Recipients that have to deal with many donors face high
administrative costs adapting to the different standards and timetables of their various donors.
Fragmentation that extends to the sectoral level suggests additional problems with donor
coordination.  Thus, the costs of fragmentation are likely tied to the extent and depth of
fragmentation.
Administrative inefficiencies are greater still if fragmentation extends to the project level.2
Do the same forces that drive donors to spread their aid across many recipients and sectors also result
in smaller projects?  Greater donor fragmentation is likely to lead to smaller individual donor
budgets within each recipient country and this may naturally lead to smaller individual projects.  But
do the factors driving donor fragmentation extend beyond this so that, even controlling for the donor
budget within the country, projects are smaller when the donor's fragmentation is higher? 
There are many possible reasons donors fragment their aid.  Those discussed in the literature
include geopolitics, domestic politics, and herding  (Acharya et al., 2006; Frot and Santiso, 2009a,b).
Another as yet unexplored reason is the pursuit of bureaucratic and personal interests, consistent with
a public choice approach.  Donor agencies and their staff may benefit – in terms of budget, status or
professional perks – from having a more global portfolio of projects.  These factors will also be
linked with reduced project size and its associated inefficiencies.  Such bureaucratic competition is
best measured with a new "agency fragmentation" variable, the fragmentation of a donor's aid across
its various implementing agencies.
This paper explores links between aid fragmentation and project size using PLAID 1.9.1 data
on 22 bilateral aid donors from 1973 to 2008.  The unit of analysis is the individual project, a
disaggregated design that allows one to control for a wide variety of factors including donor,
recipient and sectoral fixed effects.  Estimations include measures of the donor's overall country
budget (excluding the project in question) and fragmentation.  This approach can explore whether
the forces driving fragmentation extend to the project level and sheds some light on the underlying
factors driving aid fragmentation.
The analysis demonstrates that project size is negatively related to bilateral donor
fragmentation but not to recipient fragmentation, ceteris paribus.  Controlling for the donor's other3
spending in the country, higher donor fragmentation is linked to smaller projects.  Specifically, a
donor's projects are smaller when the donor's administrative structure is more fragmented, i.e., when
the donor's overall aid budget is more fragmented across its various funding agencies.  There is
evidence of a "tourist destination effect," supporting a public choice interpretation of donor agency
behavior.
These effects of donor fragmentation on project size indicate that the costs of proliferation
extend to the project level and that they are donor-driven.  This underscores the magnitude of the
problem and role fragmentation plays in reducing aid effectiveness.  Using the available data to
determine the optimal project size for promoting development is not straightforward but that optimal
size is clearly not a function of donor political or bureaucratic interests.
Section II reviews the existing work on aid fragmentation and project size.  Section III
introduces the notation used to structure this analysis and describes the data.  Section IV presents
estimation results.  Section V concludes.
II. Literature Review
The literature on aid fragmentation examines three distinct issues: measurement, impact, and
causes.  There are a number of different dimensions along which to measure fragmentation.
Measurements of donor fragmentation reflect how widely the donor spreads its aid budget.  Acharya
et al. (2006) draw on the income inequality literature for the Theil Index while others (e.g., Easterly
and Pfutze, 2008) use a market concentration measure from the industrial organization literature, the
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI).  These are constructed using data on aid flows from a single
donor to all of its recipients.  To a large extent, this dimension of fragmentation is viewed as a4
measure of the source of the fragmentation problem.  Measurements of recipient fragmentation
reflect the diversity of sources of aid receipts.   Most are based on the HHI constructed using data
for aid flows from all donors to a single recipient.  The recipient level measure is viewed as the
problem of fragmentation.  The data suggest that both types of fragmentation have increased over
time despite several international attempts to combat the issue (Frot and Santiso, 2008).
The OECD DAC and some other scholars (Frot, 2009; Frot and Santiso, 2009a) use a
somewhat different measure of fragmentation.  Donor i is classified as a significant donor for
recipient j if donor i's share of country j's total aid receipts is greater than donor i's share of world
aid receipts.  The donor's degree of fragmentation is then the proportion of its aid partners in which
it is an insignificant donor.
Another important measurement issue arises from limitations of existing data sources
(including PLAID), i.e., determining which financial flows correspond to projects.  Acharya et al.
(2006) suggest focusing on "significant aid events" (defined as cases where the individual aid flow
exceeds $500,000) to avoid counting transfers not linked to actual projects.  The authors note that
"a substantial proportion of all aid events take the form of small grants, notably for travel and
education scholarships, or for in-country events financed directly from the donor’s embassy. It seems
likely that these kinds of activities typically do not generate the kinds of transactions costs with
which we are concerned" (pp. 8-9).  The discussion in Easterly and Pfutze (2008, p. 41) illustrates
a range of these small transfers, concluding that  "when aid is this small, it’s hard to believe it even
covers the fixed costs of granting and receiving it, much less any operating costs of actually helping
people."  These different interpretations present a non-trivial issue for empirical work.  For example
in the PLAID 1.9.1 data covering the 23 OECD bilateral donors, there are 653,368 separate aidMany sums are so small that it is nearly inconceivable that they reflect actual development
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projects. Again looking just at DAC bilateral donors, over 100,000 entries are for less than $10,000,
over 15,000 for less than $1,000 and over 2500 for less than $100.
This argument assumes the government employee is not paid her marginal product, a
2
reasonable assumption in the case of a public good.
5
events listed, including 490,637 insignificant ones (averaging under $100,000) and 162,731
significant ones (averaging $10 million).  In this work, I follow Acharya et al. (2006) in examining
only significant aid events where commitments exceed $500,000 in constant 2000 U.S. dollars.
1
The second strand of the literature assesses the impact of fragmentation.  Problems caused
by fragmentation have long been noted by practitioners (Morss, 1984; Easterly and Pfutze, 2008) and
frequently featured in official publications (OECD, 2008, 2009a, 2009b; World Bank, 2003).
Acharya  et al. (2006) provide a concise catalogue of potential problems arising from fragmentation,
some of which have been explored empirically.
Knack and Rahman (2007) explore a link between recipient fragmentation and bureaucratic
quality in countries with a limited pool of skilled bureaucrats.   They argue that skilled government
bureaucrats provide important public goods that, among other effects, improve the development
impact of all aid projects in the country.  If a donor poaches these people away from the government
to work directly on one of the donor's aid projects, the performance of that project will improve (in
spite of the drop in the overall level of public goods).  Because this reduction in public goods
impacts all actors in the economy, the donor does not bear the full cost of its actions and there is the
potential of a negative externality.   For a small donor with few aid projects in the country, the direct
2
benefits of poaching (for individual projects) outweigh the indirect costs (across the donor's portfolio
of projects).  For large donors with many aid projects in the country, the reverse is true.  Thus,The "first opportunity" is either at the start of the DAC data set (1960), the year the donor
3
country became an aid donor, or the year the recipient country gained its independence.
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greater recipient fragmentation (for a given amount of aid) means more small donors that poach
qualified government employees rather than large donors that resist poaching.  This links
fragmentation of aid in a recipient country and reduced government bureaucratic quality.  Knack and
Rahman's empirical work verifies the posited link between high recipient fragmentation and
declining bureaucratic quality, particularly in aid dependent countries where poaching is more likely
to matter.
Two studies examine the link between fragmentation and the impact of aid on growth
(Djankov et al., 2009; Kimura et al., 2007).  Both use cross country growth regressions and find that
too much fragmentation reduces the development effectiveness of aid.
The third – much less explored – direction in the literature seeks to explain why aid gets
fragmented.  Acharya et al. (2006) suggest that the "one country, one vote" system in the UN General
Assembly makes it cheaper to buy influence through aid to small countries, giving donors a reason
to run small aid programs in a wide range of small countries.  Frot and Santiso (2009a) note that
donors are attracted to poorer, more democratic countries, possibly for altruistic reasons, possibly
to garner support for aid at home.  The net effect of many donors in a given country, for whatever
reason, is increased fragmentation of aid.  Frot (2009) finds that "early aid partners" (those countries
that received aid from a donor at the earliest opportunity) continue to get a substantial share of the
donor's funds while "late aid partners" get a small share.   In other words, donors typically expand
3
their distribution of aid by initiating smaller programs in additional countries.  Using the DACUsing an HHI measure, this approach increases fragmentation less than the alternative of
4
equal division among all recipients.
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measure of fragmentation, this increases aid fragmentation for both donors and recipients.   Frot and
4
Santiso (2009b) find evidence of herding among donors, a behavior that can contribute to
fragmentation in "aid darlings."  They do not find clear determinants of herding, an outcome that is
"what we would expect if donors did not herd 'rationally' and [instead] followed what others did in
an informational cascade fashion with no clear rationale" (Frot and Santiso, 2009b, 26).
Roodman (2006a, 2006b) straddles the "impact" and "causes" categories, developing a model
in which recipient fragmentation leads to smaller projects (i.e., project fragmentation).  Roodman
(2006a) sets out a model with an exogenously given donor menu of projects of various sizes (aid
amounts).  "Production" requires input of complementary recipient resources so the recipient
government effectively decides which projects to implement through the allocation of its own
resources.  The recipient has dual objectives, development impact and "throughput" (a catch-all for
any private benefits accruing to decision makers).  In addition, for each project the recipient faces
fixed administrative costs.  The result is that an increase in aid (project proliferation) can drive the
recipient to select smaller projects.
Roodman (2006b) extends the model in two ways.  First, more recipient "oversight" raises
a project's development impact but oversight requirements increase less than proportionately with
project size.  Given the costs of oversight, this leads to an optimal project size.  Comparative statics
based on this indicate that "projects should be larger in countries that a) are better governed, b) have
less administrative capacity in absolute terms, or c) receive more aid—all else equal" (Roodman,
2006b, 3).  However, if donors care disproportionately about their own projects, competition8
between donors will link greater recipient fragmentation to smaller projects.
III. Notation and Data
  The analysis of project size in this paper uses a range of fragmentation measures, all based
on HHI of aid concentration.  In addition to the standard donor, recipient, and sector fragmentation
variables, I introduce "agency fragmentation."  These measures are conceptually simple but difficult
to describe succinctly so this section develops the necessary notation for precise definitions then
proceeds to describe the data.
Throughout this section, c stands for commitments while different subscripts on c indicate
different aggregations of commitments.  To index donors, I use i = 1,...,n; for recipients, j = 1,...,m.
Projects are indexed by k = 1,...,K, donor funding agencies by a = 1,...,A, sectors by s = 1,...,S, and
years by t = 1,...,T.
The measures of fragmentation are of the basic form (1!HHI) where the HHI is defined
differently for each measure.  Using the notation above, the fragmentation of donor i's aid budget
across its recipients in year t is
it Donor Fragmentation  = (1)
ijt where c  is the total commitment amount from donor i to recipient j in year t (across all sectors and
funding agencies).  Similarly, the fragmentation of donor i's aid budget across its various bilateral




it Agency Fragmentation  = (2)
iat where c  is the total commitment amount from donor i's funding agency a in year t (across all
recipients and sectors).  Fragmentation of donor i's aid budget across sectors in year t is
it Sector Fragmentation  = (3)
ist where c  is the total commitment amount from donor i to projects in sector s in year t (across all
funding agencies and recipients).
Turning to recipient measures, fragmentation of recipient j's aid receipts across donors in year
t is
jt Recipient Fragmentation  = (4)
ijt where c  is as in (1).  Finally, fragmentation of recipient j's aid receipts across sectors in year t is
jt Recipient-Sector Fragmentation  = (5)
jst where c  is the total commitment amount to projects in recipient j in sector s in year t (across all
donors and agencies).
The data use in this analysis are described in Table 1.  Variables include measures
constructed from the project-level aid commitments of 22 DAC bilateral donors (PLAID 1.9.1 data)
and characteristics of recipient countries.   The unit of observation is the project, where I follow
5This represents about 10 recipients per donor per year where the donor funds only one
6
project.   These observations drop due to log of zero.  See the description of the donor budget
variable below.
The relatively low average project size reflects the impact of the log transformation.
7
Directly using dollar amounts yields an average of $8.5 million.  Given the number of small
"significant aid events," it is possible this definition still includes some transfers that are not proper
aid projects.
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Acharya et al. (2006) in defining a project as a significant aid event, i.e., an entry in the PLAID data
set with a commitment amount greater than $500,000 in constant year 2000 U.S. dollars.  After
imposing this condition, the sample is determined by data availability.  PLAID 1.9.1 data on DAC
bilateral donors run from 1973 to 2008 and include 162,731 project observations.  For 5,492 projects
(including all  335 observations for Korea), no data exist on the concessionality of funding (Grant
Element).  Missing data for country characteristics further reduce the sample by 13,680 projects
across a range of countries and years.  An additional 8,973 observations drop because the donor
funded only one project in the country that year.  The resulting estimation sample includes 134,586
6
projects funded by 22 donors in 156 recipient countries.
Table 1 lists descriptive statistics for this sample.  Project Size (the dependent variable) is
defined as the log of the commitment amount, measured in constant year 2000 dollars and is drawn
from the PLAID database.  Project Size averages 14.72 (about $2.5 million) and ranges from 13.2
(just above the $500,000 cutoff) to 22.67 ($7 billion – Germany aid to Poland in 1992).  About thirty
percent of the observations are for projects of less than $1 million and 43 observations are for
projects of more than $1 billion.   Donor Budget is the log of the sum of the donor's commitments
7
to the recipient country in that year.  This budget sum is calculated without the amount for the project
at hand to avoid endogeneity and therefore equals zero when the donor funds only one project in theThe average without the log transformation is $140 million.  The 1991 value for U.S. aid
8
to Egypt includes military debt forgiven by the U.S. following Egypt's support in the first Gulf War.
At this time, Japan was emerging as the largest aid donor.  In a related move, the OECD DAC
temporarily changed its rules to allow write-offs of military aid loans to count toward individual
donor's development assistance totals, mainly benefitting the U.S. (Raffer, 1998).
11
recipient country in the given year.  These cases drop from the sample (log of zero).  Donor Budget
averages 17.36 ($35 million), running from 13.12 ($500,000 from Ireland to Rwanda in 2004) to
22.73 ($7.4 billion from the United States to Egypt in 1991).  About 2.5% of the observations have
Donor Budget values of less than 13.8 ($1 million) and a similar number have Donor Budget values
greater than 20.7 ($1 billion).
8
The five fragmentation measures described above have a theoretical maximum range from
0 to (N-1)/N where N is the number of categories considered (recipient countries, donor agencies,
sectors or donors, depending on the measure).  All five variables reach the minimum of 0
fragmentation.  For example, fourteen projects in Mozambique funded by Portugal in the 1980s have
zero Donor Fragmentation since Portugal's only aid recipient in those years was Mozambique.  The
average Donor Fragmentation across recipients is 0.92.  The maximum Donor Fragmentation is
0.971 (U.S., 2002); 15 donors average over 0.9.  The average Agency Fragmentation is 0.43, the
maximum is 0.82 (France, 1973), 10 donors average over 0.35, and 3 donors average less than 0.05.
The Sector Fragmentation is 0.83, the maximum is 0.93 (Switzerland, 2003), and 12 donors average
above 0.85.  The average Recipient Fragmentation is 0.67, the maximum is 0.92 (Mozambique,
2005), 3 recipients average over 0.85 while 2 always receive aid from only one donor (Recipient
Fragmentation=0).  Finally, the average Recipient-Sector Fragmentation is 0.77, the maximum is
0.93 (Nicaragua, 2008), 4 recipients average over 0.85 while 2 recipients average less than 0.1.
Correlations between the various fragmentation measures are low (less than 0.1 in absolute value)12
except between Donor Fragmentation and Sector Fractionation (D=0.48), Sector Fragmentation and
Agency Fragmentation (D=!0.20), and Recipient Fragmentation and Recipient-Sector
Fragmentation (D=0.50).
The number of funding agencies (# Funding Agencies) of an individual donor ranges from
1 to 16 (U.S., 2005-2007); four other donors have at least 10 separate funding agencies at some
point.  Grant Element measures the concessionality of aid as some flows take the form of low
interest, long maturity concessional loans rather than outright grants.  That said, the average grant
element is high at 95.6 on a 0 to 100 scale; 89 percent of the projects are pure grants.  Among the
projects financed via loans, the average grant element is 61 percent and only a relatively few cases
fall below the 25 percent concessionality normally needed to qualify as official development
assistance (ODA).
Table 1 also describes recipient country characteristics.  These include population and a
purchasing power parity measure of GDP per capita.  The Freedom House index (Freedom House)
is the simple average of the political rights and civil liberties indices; the index is inverted
(subtracted from 7) so that higher values indicate greater rights/liberties.  The Polity variable ranges
from !10 (complete autocracy) to +10 (complete democracy).  The dummy variable War indicates
a major conflict with more than 1000 conflict related deaths in that year.  These are important control
variables since both Project Size and aid fragmentation may be correlated with  them.
Appendix Table A1 describes the sectoral composition of the sample.  Designations follow
the OECD sector/purpose codes at the two digit level except that a few closely related sectors are
combined (Emergency Assistance and Reconstruction combined with Emergency Relief; unspecified




observations per sector, ranging from 51 observations (Disaster Prevention) to over 14,000
observations (Civil /Public sector and Agriculture).
IV. Estimation Results
All estimations include donor, recipient, sector and year dummies with the exception of Table
4 which excludes recipient dummies.  The tables report recipient-clustered t-statistics (using the 155
recipient countries); results are generally similar with donor-clustered t-statistics.  Table 2 presents
two baseline specifications that omit the central fragmentation variables.  Column 1 reports results
for country characteristics alone.  As one would expect in a regression including recipient country
fixed effects, few characteristics emerge as significant.  Population (in log terms) is weakly
positively related to Project Size (also in log terms) with a one percent higher-than-normal
Population corresponding to a 0.3 percent higher-than-normal Project Size.   Per capita income (in
9
log terms) is negative related to Project Size with a one percent higher-than-normal income
corresponding to a 0.2 percent lower-than-normal Project Size.  There is no statistically significant
association between the Freedom House index, the Polity score or the existence of a major conflict,
on the one hand, and Project Size on the other in this fixed effects specification.  In an estimation
excluding recipient fixed effects, the association between Population and Project Size is more
consistent (p<0.0005) but still small (0.1) while the GDP per capita link is no longer evident.  The
model including all fixed effects and country variables accounts for 25 percent of the variation inSome types of projects may scale more with country size, for example large infrastructure
10
projects (in the Transportation and Energy sectors) and budget support.  To allow for this, I interact
sector dummies (excluding Education) with Population.  Projects in a number of sectors do scale
up more in larger countries (Population programs, Transportation, Communications, Energy,
Finance, Budget Support, Food Aid, Import Support).  I also allow income effects to vary by sector;
there are significant differences in a few sectors (Agriculture, Industry, Debt Relief, and
Administration).  Interactions with Polity finds different effects for Other Social Sector, Food Aid,
Import Support, and Debt Relief; for Freedom House, it is the Health and Other Social Sector




Column 2 adds three donor or project related variables.  Donor Budget is the log of the sum
of all the budgets for the donor's other projects in the same country and year.  A one percent increase
in that budget is associated with 0.1 percent higher budget for the current project.  Thus, a big donor
does big projects.  As noted above, Donor Budget is a key control variable because the interesting
questions about the link between fragmentation and project size are conditional on the donor's
budget.
The second variable added is the number of funding agencies in the donor government that
year (# Funding Agencies).  This variable is global (i.e., includes agencies not operating in the
country in question) and varies by donor and year.  As one would expect from a bureaucratic model,
this enters with a negative and significant coefficient.  Evaluated at the mean, this indicates that
going from the lowest value (1 agency) to the highest (16) is associated with a $1.5 million reduction
in project size.  However, the significance of this coefficient is driven entirely by the Food Aid
sector; the estimated coefficient drops by half and is no longer significant if Food Aid projects are
omitted.  Other estimation results are comparable if # Funding Agencies is included when the sample
contains Food Aid projects or if # Funding Agencies is omitted and Food Aid projects dropped.  The
results for fragmentation are effected if # Funding Agencies is omitted without dropping Food AidExcluding # Funding Agencies but including Food Aid projects strengthens the coefficients
11
for  Agency Fragmentation and Sector Fragmentation but weakens the coefficient for Donor
Fragmentation.  I maintain the reported specification because those results (inter alia, the
insignificance of Sector Fragmentation) are more robust across specifications.  Either formulation
supports the main results reported.
As one would anticipate given the massive t-statistic on Grant Element, omitting this
12
variable increases the economic and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients on the
central fragmentation variables reported below.
15
projects.  In short, the number of funding agencies the donor has appears to control for differences
in the role of fragmentation in the Food Aid sector relative to the role of fragmentation in other
sectors.
11
Finally, the grant element of a project is significantly related to Project Size, with more
concessional financing linked to smaller projects.  The relationship persists if we restrict the sample
to ODA qualifying concessionality (Grant Element $ 25) or exclude pure grants, though the size of
the effect is substantially reduced in the latter case.
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Table 3 adds the key fragmentation variables to the baseline specification from Table 2,
Column 2.  I introduce each fragmentation variable separately, in groups (donor v. recipient
measures) and then simultaneously.  The relatively low correlations between the various
fragmentation measures suggests that results will be similar whether the variables are introduced
individually or jointly.  Looking across the eight columns of Table 3 confirms this.
The first variable introduced measures the fragmentation of the donor's aid budget across the
recipient countries.  Donor Fragmentation enters with a significant, negative coefficient across all
three columns; including other fragmentation variables only reduces the magnitude of the estimated
coefficient by 10 percent.  The estimated coefficient indicates that Project Size decreases as the
donor's aid budget becomes more fragmented across recipients.  The estimated effect is non-trivialTo avoid concerns about endogeneity, Donor Budget excludes the amount for the current
13
observation (i.e., it is the sum of the commitment amounts for donor's other projects in that country
in that year).  However, results are identical without this refinement.
16
for large changes in fragmentation.  Assuming the lowest Donor Fragmentation (0) for an otherwise
average project predicts a project size of $3,346,750.  For the same project with Donor
Fragmentation increased to the highest value in the sample (0.97), predicted project size falls to
$2,352,525, a decrease of almost $1 million or 30%.
To understand what this result means in a regression context, it is important to consider the
other included variables.  One explanation for the link between a proliferation of recipients and
smaller projects is purely mechanical.  If the donor expands its reach to new countries without a
proportionate increase in its overall aid budget, its per-country budget is reduced.  A natural response
to a diminished budget might be to shrink rather than cut projects.  However, the estimated equation
includes the donor's budget in the recipient country (Donor Budget) and thus already controls for this
effect directly.   In short, the impact of fragmentation on Project Size measured here is not through
13
the budget.  The most apparent alternative interpretation is that fragmentation serves as a proxy for
another factor that both increases Donor Fragmentation and reduces Project Size.
The second fragmentation variable introduced in Table 3 measures the fragmentation of the
donor's aid across its various implementing agencies (Agency Fragmentation).  Again, this variable
enters with a significant, negative coefficient that is stable across the three specifications.  The
estimated coefficient indicates that Project Size decreases as the donor's aid budget becomes more
fragmented across its implementing agencies.  Assuming the lowest Agency Fragmentation (0) for
an otherwise average project predicts a project size of $2,730,790.  For the same project with Agency
Fragmentation increased to the highest value in the sample (0.82), predicted project size falls toOne could, again, include the agency budget to separately identify what is explained by
14
Agency Fragmentation and what is explained by agency budgets.  Both prove to be statistically
significant (with the expected sign).  Using these estimates to construct a best case (going from the
highest agency budget and lowest fragmentation) to worst case scenario (lowest agency budget and
highest fragmentation) leads to an 85% reduction in project size.  However, it is not clear that
separately identifying these two components is useful since both reflect the same underlying
bureaucratic process.
17
$2,143,820, a decrease of nearly $600,000 or 20%.  The most direct interpretation of this result is
that increased bureaucratic competition in the donor country (proxied by Agency Fragmentation) is
linked to smaller projects in developing countries.
14
The estimated coefficients for the other fragmentation variables are small and statistically
insignificant across all specifications in Table 3.  The contrast between the significant donor
variables and the insignificant recipient variables is particularly interesting.  It suggests that
reductions in project size accompanying aid fragmentation are driven by donor country forces rather
than administrative factors in the recipient country.
One important caveat on the first fragmentation result (Donor Fragmentation) is in order:
the result depends critically on the U.S.  The results reported in Table 3 hold across all samples that
include U.S.-funded projects but disappear if those projects are dropped.  In contrast, the Agency
Fragmentation result is robust to dropping donors or sectors from the estimation sample.  This
means that the first result, while important, reflects factors idiosyncratic to the forces driving
fragmentation of U.S. aid.  In contrast, the bureaucratic competition behind the link between Agency
Fragmentation and reduced Project Size appear to be more universal.
The evidence that bureaucratic competition among donor agencies reduces project size
suggests exploring a more direct public choice-type question.  Do the narrow self-interests of aid
agency bureaucrats influence the size of development projects?  To address this question, I testThe ideal data would report tourist arrivals in each year and from each donor country.
15
Because these specifications do not include recipient country fixed effects, it is difficult to
16
interpret the meaning of the increased size of the coefficients on the recipient fragmentation
variables.
18
whether aid projects in countries that are popular tourist destinations are smaller than those in less
attractive locals, ceteris paribus.  Given a predetermined country-level aid budget, a strategy of
proliferating small projects would maximize the number of trips by aid agency administrators to
these popular destinations.
Table 4 reports results.  The Tourism variable simply counts the number of tourist arrivals
in the country (in millions); data are available in cross section only and not for every country.   The
15
results are consistent with a public choice interpretation.  Looking across all donors (Column 1),
there is a marginally significant, negative effect.  Moving from the least popular to the most popular
tourist destination reduces the predicted size of an otherwise average project by about $150,000.
However, the impact is not homogeneous across donors.  There is no apparent effect for France,
Germany, Italy and Spain.  Column 2 reports results for the remaining donors.  The effect is now
statistically significant (p=.001) and the shift from least popular to most popular tourist destination
predicts a $500,000 reduction in the size of an otherwise average project.  Again, these results
control for the donor's country-wide budget.  For a given budget, a donor bureaucracy can justify
more trips to the country with a portfolio of many small projects than with a portfolio of a few large
projects.  While these results are far from conclusive (particularly because shortcomings in the
available data preclude use of recipient fixed effects), they do lend support to a public choice
interpretation of the earlier findings.
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V. Conclusion
What is the right size for an aid project?  Is a given project too big or too small?  There are
important costs associated with either bias.  The early literature (e.g., Tendler, 1975) focused on a
bias toward inefficiently large, capital-intensive projects.  Such projects are more administratively
efficient for the donor agency, more attractive to special interest groups in the donor country
(particularly for tied aid), and more likely to make it through the bureaucratic approval process.  The
result, according to Tendler, is a pardoxical abundance of development assistance, a bias toward
overly large, capital and import intensive projects and against the development of local industry.
This bias undermines the individual aid project's return per dollar spent as well as its contribution
to the development of the wider economy.
The recent literature on aid fragmentation and absorptive capacity focuses on exactly the
opposite phenomenon, a multitude of donor agencies and small projects that threaten to overwhelm
the institutional capacity of recipient governments.  Fragmentation can undermine the development
effectiveness of aid and, more broadly, the development effectiveness of the recipient government.
Higher transactions costs reduce the value of aid and the lack of coordination between donors can
generate an incoherent overall approach (even if each component is well-executed).  Transactions
costs rise and coordination worsens with increases in the number of donors, the number of donor
agencies, and the number of projects.  Recipient governments face sunk costs for each donor, each
funding agency of that donor, and each project of that funding agency.  At the sectoral level, the
more fragmented is sectoral aid, the greater the odds of an incoherent overall approach.  For these
reasons, fragmentation at the donor, funding agency, sector and project level are all critical issues.
Given potential biases in both directions, questions about the efficient size of projects are20
best explored by studying the mechanisms at work rather than looking directly at outcomes such as
trends over time.  This is particularly true since time trends in reporting compliance are likely to
confound any purely temporal analysis.
This paper focuses on the role bureaucratic competition and staff self-interest play in
determining the size of aid projects.  I measure bureaucratic competition via an aid agency
fragmentation variable that mirrors concentration indices from the industrial organization literature.
The empirical analysis is at the project level and draws on PLAID data covering 22 bilateral aid
donors from 1973 to 2008.  Estimation results demonstrate that projects are smaller when the donor's
administrative structure is more fragmented.  There is suggestive evidence of a tourist effect, i.e., the
popularity of a recipient country as a travel destination influences project size.  These two findings
together support a public choice interpretation of donor agency behavior, providing another
explanation for aid fragmentation.21
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (N=134,586)
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max Description      
Project Size 14.69     1.273     13.12     22.67     log commitments, constant 2000 USD
Donor Budget 17.38     1.711     13.12     22.73     log sum of donor commitments in country (excluding current project), constant 2000 $
Fragmentation
    Donor 0.9159     0.06856    0         0.971      1 - Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index for donor (across recipient countries)
    Agency 0.4376     0.2732     0  0.82       1 - Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index for donor agencies (across recipient countries)
    Sector 0.828      0.1138     0         0.931      1 - Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index for donor sectors (across recipient countries)
    Recipient 0.6678     0.183      0  0.9156    1 - Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index for recipient (across donors)
    Recipient-Sector 0.7714     0.1455     0         0.9314    1 - Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index for sectors, by recipient (across donors)
# Funding Agencies 5.478     3.942     1         16        Number of aid funding agencies, by donor & year
Grant Element 95.6      13.77     0         100       Grant element of project
Population 3.014     1.689     -4.061    7.19      log of population in millions
GDP per capita 7.617     0.7984     4.194     10.19     log of PPP GDP per capita in chained 2000 $
Freedom House 4.391     1.566     1         7         Averaged Freedom House Rating (inverted)
Polity 0.633      6.348     -10       10        Polity IV index
War 0.09961    0.2995     0         1         Dummy indicating on-going major conflict (>1000 dead)
Fragmentation Correlations (N=134,586)




Sector 0.4790 -0.1736 1
Recipient -0.0143 -0.0920 0.0563 1
Recipient-Sector 0.0218 -0.0295 0.0329 0.5029 125
Table 2: Baseline Regressions
(1) (2)
                           Dependent Variable:  Project Size
Donor Budget 0.119**
(14.92)












GDP per capita -0.204** -0.183**
(-3.63) (-3.76)
N 134,586 134,586
All specifications include year, sector, donor and recipient dummies.
t statistics in parentheses based on recipient-clustered standard errors.
* p<.1, ** p<.0526
Table 3: Regressions including Fragmentation measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable: Project Size
Donor Budget 0.119** 0.119** 0.119** 0.119** 0.118** 0.119** 0.118** 0.119**
(14.93) (14.79) (14.89) (14.74) (14.63) (14.89) (14.63) (14.44)
Fragmentation
    Donor -0.404** -0.364** -0.363**
(-4.23) (-3.47) (-3.48)
    Agency -0.311** -0.294** -0.295**
(-6.25) (-5.86) (-5.90)
    Sector -0.0737 0.0329 0.0318
(-1.16) (0.46) (0.45)
    Recipient -0.0624 -0.0704 -0.0761
(-1.30) (-1.24) (-1.34)
    Recipient-Sector -0.0111 0.0209 0.0276
(-0.22) (0.35) (0.47)
# Funding Agencies -0.0285** -0.0220** -0.0260** -0.0241** -0.0270** -0.0271** -0.0270** -0.0239**
(-5.71) (-4.26) (-5.56) (-4.55) (-5.51) (-5.55) (-5.49) (-4.49)
Grant Element -0.0228** -0.0225** -0.0228** -0.0225** -0.0228** -0.0228** -0.0228** -0.0225**
(-18.69) (-18.71) (-18.69) (-18.69) (-18.75) (-18.72) (-18.76) (-18.72)
N 134,586 134,586 134,586 134,586 134,586 134,586 134,586 134,586
Specifications include Freedom House, Polity, Population, and GDP per capita plus year, sector, donor, recipient & War dummies.
t statistics in parentheses based on recipient-clustered standard errors.
* p<.1, ** p<.0527
Table 4: Regressions including Tourism
(1) (2)
                                 Dependent Variable: Project Size
Tourism -0.00533* -0.00999**
(-1.82) (-3.40)
Donor Budget 0.135** 0.145**
(13.19) (10.80)
Fragmentation
    Donor -0.393** -0.209
(-3.29) (-1.52)
    Agency -0.325** -0.319**
(-5.16) (-4.62)
    Sector 0.0688 0.287**
(0.84) (2.63)
    Recipient -0.152** -0.207**
(-1.99) (-2.67)
    Recipient-Sector 0.0943 0.170*
(1.11) (1.89)
# Funding Agencies -0.0233** -0.0216**
(-3.85) (-2.88)
Grant Element -0.0227** -0.0199**
(-17.89) (-11.89)
N 105,634 77,237
Specifications include Freedom House, Polity, Population, and GDP per capita plus year, sector,
donor, recipient & War dummies.
Column (2) excludes France, Germany, Italy and Spain.
t statistics in parentheses based on recipient-clustered standard errors.
* p<.1, ** p<.0528
Appendix
Table A1: Sector Variables
Variable Mean Description      
Admin 0.003931   Dummy indicating administrative costs
Agr 0.1083     Dummy indicating project in agriculture sector
Budget Support 0.01557    Dummy indicating budget support
Civil 0.1099     Dummy indicating civil or public sector project
Communications 0.01462    Dummy indicating communications sector
Debt 0.02865    Dummy indicating debt relief/rescheduling
Disaster 0.0003046  Dummy indicating disaster prevention sector
Ed 0.09181    Dummy indicating Education sector
Emergency 0.0862     Dummy indicating Emergency sector
Energy 0.03586    Dummy indicating Energy sector
Environment 0.02415    Dummy indicating Environment sector
Finance 0.01467    Dummy indicating Financial sector
Food Aid 0.0518     Dummy indicating Food Aid
Health 0.06753    Dummy indicating Health sector
Import 0.01366    Dummy indicating Import sector
Industry 0.03841    Dummy indicating Industrial sector
Multi 0.07143    Dummy indicating multi-sector project
NGO 0.004391   Dummy indicating NGO project
Other Business 0.01304    Dummy indicating other business sector
Other Social 0.04145    Dummy indicating other social sector projects
Pop 0.03743    Dummy indicating Population sector
Reconstruction 0.00662    Dummy indicating Reconstruction sector
Refugee 0.003507   Dummy indicating Refugee spending
TT 0.006435   Dummy indicating Trade and Tourism sector
Transportation 0.04616    Dummy indicating Transportation sector
Water 0.04748    Dummy indicating Water sector
Unspecified 0.01672    Dummy indicating unspecified sector
Table A2:  Data Sources
Variable Source
Aid Data Nielson et al. (2010)
Freedom House Freedom House (2007)
GDP per capita Heston et al. (2002), World Bank (2008)
Polity Polity IV Project (2005)
Population Heston et al. (2002), World Bank (2008)
Tourism Nationmaster (2010)
War Gleditsch et al. (2002)